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Abstract
This paper discusses the effects of macroeconomic volatility on human capital formation.
Simple cross-country scatterplots as well as existing empirical studies, which typically
measure volatility by the standard deviation of GDP growth, show a negative relationship.
Using panel data for a large group of countries in 1970-2000, we find that: (i) the negative
effect of macroeconomic volatility on human capital formation in existing empirical studies is
not robust; (ii) controlling for government education spending, the volatility effect on human
capital can even become positive; (iii) using a time-varying volatility measure and controlling
for possible endogeneity of volatility and other explanatory variables in IV-estimation, the
effect we find is always positive.  Theoretically, we build a simple model which can explain a
positive volatility effect on human capital formation  while at the same time being consistent
with the basic negative cross-country correlation. A key idea is that volatility may encourage
people to study for reasons of insurance. Government education expenditures may be crucial
to realise this ambition 
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Since the emergence of the real business cycle literature and the endogenous growth theory
many researchers have investigated effects of cyclical fluctuations (macroeconomic volatility)
on long-run growth.  Theoretically, the results are ambiguous. As shown by Aghion and Saint-
Paul (1998), when the activity that generates productivity growth is a substitute to production,
recessions will stimulate this activity and a larger amplitude and frequency of business-cycle
fluctuations may have a positive effect on long-run growth. When productivity enhancing
activities are a complement to production, the opposite holds (e.g. Martin and Rogers, 1997).
A negative effect of volatility on growth may also follow from higher risk and uncertainty that
come with it. Empirically, Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) find a positive relationship between
volatility and growth. More studies, however, find a negative relationship (e.g. Ramey and
Ramey, 1995; Martin and Rogers, 2000). More recently, Fatás (2002) and Hnatkovska and
Loayza (2003) challenge the hypothesis of a simple relationship by showing that the influence
of macroeconomic volatility on growth depends on structural country characteristics. In poor
countries they observe a negative relationship, in richer countries with well-developed credit
markets a positive one.   
This paper focuses on the effects of macroeconomic volatility on human capital
formation. Although the importance of human capital for growth has been widely recognized
in theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Temple, 2001; Sianesi
and  Van  Reenen,  2003),  the  literature  dealing  with  the  human  capital  effects  of
macroeconomic volatility is very limited. Several potential theoretical channels have been
highlighted, but the number of empirical studies is remarkably small.  Existing empirical
studies basically find that macroeconomic volatility, measured by the standard deviation of
GDP growth, negatively affects human capital formation (Flug et al., 1998; Checchi and
García-Peñalosa, 2004).  A simple scatterplot for 88 countries in Figure 1, relating a measure
for the human capital stock in 2000 to macroeconomic volatility in 1970-1999, is consistent
with these findings.  However, using alternative indicators for volatility, some studies obtain
positive effects on human capital. Skidmore and Toya (2002) observe positive effects from
higher frequencies of climatic disasters. Heylen, Pozzi and Vandewege (2004) find positive
human capital effects from inflation crises and inflation variability. 
Figure 1. Volatility and human capital, 88 countries
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0This paper reconsiders and extends the analysis of the volatility – human capital relationship.
Its contribution is double. First, we examine the robustness of existing empirical studies using
the long-term standard deviation of GDP growth as a volatility measure. We find that
robustness is very poor. Controlling for government expenditures on education we basically
observe insignificant, and sometimes even positive effects of macroeconomic volatility on
human capital.   Moreover, when we allow our volatility measure to vary over time, the effect
of volatility on the average level of schooling is always positive, also when we control for
possible endogeneity of explanatory variables by means of an instrumental variables approach.
Second, elaborating on Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa (2004), we build a simple theoretical
model which can explain these positive effects of volatility on human capital while at the
same time being consistent with the basic negative correlation shown in Figure 1.  More
advanced technologies may enable skilled workers and economies with a high proportion of
skilled workers to better cope with aggregate shocks (e.g. weather shocks in agriculture,
energy price shocks). Labour effectiveness  and the wage of skilled workers may by
consequence not only be higher, but also less volatile.  The economy may then move from a
volatile, low human capital regime to a less volatile, high human capital regime. Government
spending on education reducing the cost of studying can promote this transition. By contrast, a
high relative volatility of the labour effectiveness of the skilled may discourage education,
unless government spending on education is very high. 
In Section 2 of the paper we briefly review the main theoretical channels and existing
empirical findings with respect to the effect of macroeconomic volatility on human capital
formation. Section 3 contains the results of our own empirical investigation for a large panel
of developed and developing countries in 1970-2000. In Section 4 we present and discuss our
theoretical model. Section 5 summarizes our main findings.
32. Macroeconomic volatility and human capital investment : existing literature
2.1. Theory
Flug et al. (1998) distinguish several potential channels along which macroeconomic volatility
can affect human capital investment. Some are negative, others positive. A first hypothesis
relates to the effects of risk and uncertainty that come with increasing macroeconomic
volatility. In principle, the effects of risk on education are ambiguous. Levhari and Weiss
(1974), however, show that there are two sufficient conditions for greater risk to undermine
investment in education: the variance of income rises with the level of schooling, and agents
have declining absolute risk aversion. Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2004) make both
assumptions. Furthermore, Levhari and Weiss (1974) show that under these assumptions
higher non-labour income (wealth) will stimulate investment in education. Wealth plays the
role of insurance against the risk of studying. All other things equal, poor people will
therefore study less. To the extent that government education expenditures provide agents
with non-labour income, they encourage schooling. 
According to the first hypothesis the negative effect of volatility on human capital
formation holds whether or not credit markets exist where resources can be borrowed to
finance education. This is not so for the second hypothesis. A very specific property of  human
capital is that investment is irreversible in the sense that human capital cannot be sold. These
properties imply that investment errors are very costly. And this is where volatility comes in.
In a structurally volatile environment the likelihood of making wrong decisions rises. Agents
may be discouraged to invest in education. The fact that human capital cannot be sold also
makes it useless as a collateral. As an immediate result, this inhibits the development of credit
systems for education. Again volatility may play an adverse role. Given that volatility raises
the likelihood of investment errors, one can expect the development of credit systems for
education to be even more difficult in volatile environments. As with the first hypothesis, the
poor are more likely to bear the negative consequence of this than the rich. Also, government
support can alleviate these negative consequences.  Figure 2 is consistent with the idea that
volatility negatively affects the development of credit markets. This figure relates domestic
credit provided by the banking sector in percent of GDP to volatility in 150 countries during
the 1970s to 1990s. For each country there is one observation. Volatility is measured by the
standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth. Correlation in this figure is -0,3760.
A third hypothesis predicts positive effects from volatility on human capital. A key
element in the first hypothesis was that the level of risk associated with being educated is
higher than with remaining unskilled. The third hypothesis basically rejects this, emphasizing
that educated people face less risk and uncertainty . For example, they can apply for a broader
range of (more stable) jobs. In bad times they are more likely to be hired, especially when
unskilled wages are rigid downward. Also, educated people can handle more advanced
technologies which may enable agents to better face aggregate risk (e.g. climate, oil shocks,...)
A more volatile environment can therefore stimulate human capital investment for insurance
reasons. Elaborating on this idea, one can expect the positive incentive effect of volatility to
be higher when social safety nets are less developed (bad luck is more costly). Of course, to be
able to study for insurance reasons initial wealth should be high enough, credit should be
available, or government support provided. Again, poor people should be expected to study
less, whereas government expenditures can stimulate schooling. The model we develop in
section 4 puts these arguments at the centre.
4 Figure 2. Volatility and credit availability, 150 countries.
Data source: PWT Mark 6.1.; World Bank Development Indicators 2003
2.2. Empirical work
The available empirical evidence tends to confirm hypotheses that predict a negative effect of
volatility on human capital (Flug et al., 1998; Checchi and García-Peñalosa, 2004). Flug et al.
(1998) study the empirical link between volatility and the accumulation of human capital, i.e.
school enrolment. Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2004) focus on the stock of human capital,
i.e. average educational attainment. Both studies investigate the effects of long-term volatility.
Their volatility measures are basically standard deviations of GDP growth or employment
growth over long periods (respectively 1970-1992 and 1960-1990). Short-term measures
would rather be a reflection of shocks. Both studies also control for income inequality,
financial depth and initial GDP and/or educational attainment. The relevance of these
variables follows from existing literature as well as from our brief theoretical explanation in
the previous section. Income inequality is positively correlated to the incidence of poverty.
Financial depth variables represent the extent of access to credit. Initial income and/or
educational attainment may capture the general standard of living (and its implications for
longevity), the availability of aggregate resources to develop education systems, human capital
formation by the previous generation and teacher quality, etc. 
Running cross-section regressions for about 60 countries in 1970-92, Flug et al. find
that where employment volatility is stronger, school enrolment is lower. Using income
volatility, they find only insignificant negative effects. In a fixed effects panel data set-up,
however, significant negative effects show up. After splitting the cross-section into high and
low-income countries, Flug et al. find that employment volatility has a significant negative
effect on school enrolment in the low-income countries, while it has a positive and non-
significant effect in the high-income countries. Income volatility has a non-significant effect
in both low and high-income countries. Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2004) find that a
greater volatility in GDP growth gives rise to a lower average educational attainment. Their
largest sample covers 111 countries in 5-year intervals over 1960-95. Most of their regressions
include 70 to 80 countries. Due to the absence of a temporal dimension in their volatility
measure they cannot use a fixed effects estimator, but opt for a population-weighted least
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9In our own empirical work in the next section we will start from – and then extend –
the work by Checchi and García-Peñalosa, using a time-invariant volatility measure.  One of
our conclusions will be that their results are not robust. Depending on the empirical approach
and regression specifications, we find both negative and positive effects from volatility on
human capital.  Next we consider a time-varying volatility measure and find positive effects of
volatility in the vast majority of the estimations.  Controlling for possible endogeneities using
an instrumental variable approach does not affect the latter result. In this respect our results
may sympathize with findings by Skidmore and Toya (2002) and Heylen et al. (2004)
described in the introduction to this paper. 
3. Macroeconomic volatility and human capital investment : empirical analysis
Equation (1) is at the basis of our empirical work. In this equation Hi,t stands for the human
capital stock in country i and year t. The human capital stock is defined as average years of
total schooling for the population of age 15 and older. It is available at 5-year intervals.
 
                      
H i ,t=a0a1Voliax X iazZi ,tritit 1
Explanatory variables are a measure of macroeconomic volatility (Voli) as well as a number of
other determinants of investment in human capital (Xi, Zi) relating to country i. In our first
regressions (Tables 1-3), volatility and some other explanatory variables (X) will have no time
dimension, some other explanatory variables (Z) have. Furthermore, ri is an unobserved fixed
regional effect, relevant for the region to which country i belongs, Finally,  t is a time
dummy common to all countries and it is the error term.
Tables 1 and 2 estimate different specifications of equation (1). The dependent variable is
average years of schooling. Time invariant explanatory variables X are : 
Vol : volatility, standard deviation of real GDP growth over the whole period
Credit :  credit availability 
Time variant explanatory variables Z are :
InIneq : income inequality
EdIneq : educational inequality
Goved : real per capita government expenditures on education
Kap : physical capital/output ratio
Gdp-in : initial real per capita GDP (log)
For details about the precise definition and sources of some of these variables (e.g. credit) and
the precise time periods considered, we refer to the notes below the tables.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 have been taken directly from Checchi and García-Peñalosa
(2004, their Table 2). Both show significantly negative effects of volatility on the human
capital stock. Furthermore, we observe significantly positive effects from initial GDP and the
physical capital / output ratio. Checchi and García-Peñalosa include the latter variable as a
proxy for the demand for skilled workers. It is expected to be positively related to the returns
to education. Inequality negatively affects the human capital stock. Credit availability shows
up insignificant (and with an unexpected negative sign). Note that when initial GDP is not
included, the credit variable obtains a significant positive coefficient. Columns (3) and (4) are
a first test to the robustness of Checchi and García-Peñalosa’s results.  The only change we
6have made concerns the use of more recent real GDP data. Instead of PWT.5.6. data,
regressions (3) and (4) make use of PWT.6.1. data. An important first effect of this change is a
drastic reduction in data availability, mainly due the fact that for many countries
3 GDP data
series have become shorter. For these countries it is no longer possible to calculate volatility
over 1960-90. A second effect concerns data revisions for many countries. As can be seen,
volatility is a major victim of this change in the data set. It no longer has a significant negative
effect on human capital. For the other explanatory variables, changes are much smaller.
Further tests make clear that the second effect (data revisions) fully explains this loss of
statistical significance for volatility. For example, re-estimating regression (3) with the same
98 countries but with PWT.5.6. data yield a significant coefficient equal to –0.27 for volatility
(absolute t-value 2.76). 
 Table 1. Determinants of average educational attainment, 1960-95
    Checchi and Garcia-P.    Checchi and Garcia-P.-PWT.6.1.
   (1) (2)   (3) (4)
N.countries 111 73 98 72
N.obs.  775 547   710 542
Vol -0.362 -0.256 -0.023 -0.180








     (5.52)     (4.78)
constant yes yes yes yes
years yes yes yes yes
regions  yes yes   yes yes
R²  0.668 0.864 0.652 0.857
Notes: 
Absolute t-values between brackets.
Estimation method : population-weighted least squares with robust and country-clustered standard errors.
Dependent variable : average educational attainment (years of schooling) measured at t=1965, 1970, 1975, 1980,
1985, 1990, 1995 (source : Barro and Lee, 1996)
Explanatory variables in columns (1) and (2) : Vol : standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth over 1960-
90 (source : PWT Mark.5.6.), Credit : liquid liabilities in % of GDP, averaged over 1960-89 (source: King and
Levine, 1993), Inineq : income inequality at time t (Gini, source: Deininger and Squire, 1996), Kap : physical
capital/output ratio, averaged over the five years before t  (source : Nehru and Dhareshwar, 1993), Gdp-in : log
of real per capita GDP, averaged over the five years before t  (source PWT Mark.5.6.). 
Explanatory variables in columns (3) and (4) are the same except for volatility and initial GDP, where we now
use the more recent PWT Mark.6.1.). 
3 These countries are the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, Malta, Myanmar,
Oman, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Yemen and the Republic of Yugoslavia.
7Table 2 extends the results in Table 1 by including government education spending and
alternative inequality and credit variables. In addition to income inequality, we now also
consider educational inequality (see details below the table). Again we use 5-year intervals for
the human capital stock. The time period studied is basically 1970-2000. GDP and volatility
data have been taken from the more recent  PWT.6.1.  Figure 3 justifies the use of including
government expenditures. As can be seen, this figure shows a strong negative correlation
between volatility and real per capita government expenditures on education. Most likely,
both variables are driven by common causes. Volatile countries typically share characteristics
which reduce governments’ ability and/or willingness to spend on education. Among these
characteristics  are  poverty,  dominance  of  agriculture  and/or  natural  resource-based
production, corruption, etc. (see also Gylfason, 2001). Given the potential significance of
government  education  expenditures  for  human  capital  (Capolupo,  2000;  Castelló  and
Doménech, 2002; Heylen et al., 2004), disregarding this variable may imply a specification
error. Due to their negative correlation volatility may pick up the effect of government
education spending. Its coefficient may then be biased downward.
Figure 3. Volatility and government spending on education, 103 countries
Data source: PWT Mark 6.1.; World Bank Development Indicators 2003. Pairwise correlation: -0,4473
The introduction of alternative credit and inequality variables in Table 2 has no major
influence on our results. The effect of volatility is still insignificant and negative (see e.g.
column 2). Including government education spending, however, does have strong influence. In
line with our expectation, as soon as we control for government education spending in
columns (3) and (5), the effect of volatility becomes basically zero, or even positive.  An
obvious explanation for this finding is the high positive correlation between per capita GDP in
1960 and education spending (+0.78).  If we also include initial educational attainment
(column 6), the coefficient on government education spending becomes smaller and less
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 Table 2. Determinants of average educational attainment – additional explanatory variables
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
N.countries 86 86 86 90 90 90
N.obs.   265 265 265  472 472 472
Vol -0.160 -0.200 0.185 -0.246 -0.028 0.009





Credit 0.965 -0.478 -0.218 -0.004
(1.48) (1.73) (0.96) (0.01)
Goved 1.878 0.725 0.434
(5.21) (3.24) (1.97)
Gdp-1960 0.730
            ( 1 . 2 0 )
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
years yes yes yes yes yes yes
regions   yes yes yes  yes yes yes
R²   0.719 0.749 0.855  0.678 0.896 0.901
Notes: 
Absolute t-values between brackets. Estimation method :  population-weighted least squares with robust and
country-clustered standard errors.
Dependent variable : average educational attainment (years of schooling) measured at t=1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000 (source : Barro and Lee, 2000)
Explanatory variables: Vol : standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth over 1960-99 (source : PWT
Mark.6.1.), Credit : Domestic credit provided by the banking sector, in % of GDP, averaged over the five years
before t (source : World Bank, 2003), Inineq : income inequality in the period of 5 years before t (Gini, source:
Deininger and Squire, 1996), Edineq : educational inequality in the period of 5 years before t (Gini, source :
Castelló and Doménech, 2001), Goved : log of real per capita government spending on education in the period of
5 years before t (source: Heylen et al., 2004), Gdp-1960 : log of real per capita GDP in 1960  (source PWT
Mark.6.1.). 
In Table 3 we extend the analysis in Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2004) by allowing our
volatility measure to vary over time.  Instead of taking simple standard deviations of real per
capita GDP growth over the entire period 1960-1999, we first calculate for every year in each
country the standard deviation of growth over the preceding 10 years.  Next, to match with the
set-up of our panel, we take the average of these gliding standard deviations over the five
years before t, with t=1965, 1970,...,2000).  This approach allows us to reconcile the idea of
time variation in our volatility measure with the need for a structural, long-term indicator
4.
We believe this measure to be a closer approximation of macroeconomic volatility because for
each t it truly represents the experienced volatility of the past, while standard deviations over
the entire period represent mainly future volatility if t is small (e.g. 1965) and past volatility if
t is large (e.g. 2000).  Table 3 presents our estimation results, using this alternative volatility
measure. 
4The correlation over all countries between this new measure and the time-invariant long-term standard deviation
(over 1960-1999) used in Tables 2 and 3 is 0,71.  
9  Table 3. Determinants of average educational attainment – time-varying volatility measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N.countries   90 90 90 90 90
N.Obs. 472 472 472 472 472
Vol -2 0.011 0.059 0.061 0.087 0.087
(0.16) (1.36) (1.37) (1.71) (1.86)
Ed-ineq -12.222 -12.062 -9.453 -8.887
(5.87) (5.65) (5.33) (4.73)




Gdp - 1960 0.725
(1.21)
constant yes yes yes yes yes
years yes yes yes yes yes
regions yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.67 0.88 0.88 0.9 0.9
Notes: 
Absolute t-values between brackets. Estimation method :  population-weighted least squares with robust and
country-clustered standard errors.
Dependent variable : average educational attainment (years of schooling) measured at t=1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000 (source : Barro and Lee, 2000). 
Explanatory variables: Vol-2: gliding 10 year standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth (source : PWT
Mark.6.1.) averaged over the 5 years before t , Credit : Domestic credit provided by the banking sector, in % of
GDP, averaged over the five years before t (source : World Bank, 2003), Edineq : educational inequality in the
period of 5 years before t (Gini, source : Castelló and Doménech, 2001),  Goved : log of real per capita
government spending on education in the period of 5 years before t (source: Heylen et al., 2004).  
As can be seen, using the time-varying volatility measure leads to positive volatility effects.
Although the estimated coefficients are not always statistically significant, they clearly show
that allowing the volatility measure to vary over time has an important effect on the
estimations.  The results for the other variables are similar to those reported in Table 2. 
The use of a time-varying volatility measure has an important advantage.  It allows us to
correct for potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables by using lagged values
5 as
instruments
6  in a 2SLS framework.  Income in 1960, which we consider to be exogenous, and
once lagged values of volatility, inequality, credit and government expenditures are used as
instruments. 
The results of this instrumental variable estimation are reported in Table 4.  Considering
colums (4) and (5) , for which the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that an instrumental
variable approach is required, we find significantly positive effects for the volatility measure.
These results support the hypothesis that in times of higher macroeconomic volatility people
choose to study more, for example for reasons of insurance (if they have the means and the
opportunity to do so).  The instrumental variables regression provides us with further evidence
5 We use only the value for the previous interval as an instrument.  Taking further lags does not significantly
affect the results, but is rather costly in terms of the number of observations.
6Using only one lag implies – in this case -  an exactly identified model, for which an overidentifying restrictions
test cannot be calculated.  However, when using two lags this test is possible , leaving us with 59 countries and
102 observations.  This estimation  (not reported) leads to Sargan test statistics for columns (4) and (5) of (p-
value) 0,9389 and 0,9433.  
10that governments can stimulate the average level of schooling in an economy through
expenditures on education.  The effects of credit, educational inequality and initial income are
similar to the ones found in Tables 2 and 3.   
Following Fatás (2002) and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003), column (6) allows for different
volatility effects in richer versus poorer countries. Three groups of countries are distinguished.
Empirically, we estimate these potentially different effects by specifying three dummy
variables. Rich is a dummy variable equal to 1 for “rich” countries, i.e. countries with real
GDP per capita in dollars (PPP) and 1996 prices in 1960 above 7047 (the 66 pct.). Middle is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when real GDP in 1960 is between 3027 (the 33 pct.) and 7047,
while low is a dummy for real GDP in 1960 below 3027.   As can be seen, the effect of
volatility on human capital in column (6) is significantly positive only for the group of “rich”
countries.  Also, the coefficient is larger in magnitude for this group. 
  Table 4. Determinants of average educational attainment – IV estimation
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N.Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82
N.Obs 229 229 229 229 229 229
Vol-2 0.459 0.258 0.26 0.496 0.5
(2.03) (1.78) (1.7) (2.79) (2.75)
Vol-2 * dpoor 0.483
(1.71)
Vol-2 * dmid 0.598
(1.61)
Vol-2 * drich 0.637
(2.09)
Ed-ineq -11.979 -11.963 -6.907 -6.909 -6.480
(14.75) (13.87) (4.94) (4.90) (2.36)
Credit 0.022 -0.875 -0.948 -1.023
(0.06) (2.16) (1.89) (1.42)
Goved 1.44 1.528 1.638
(4.90) (3.28) (2.82)
Gdp 1960 -0.117 -2.645
      (0.30) (0.42)
constant y e sy e sy e sy e sy e sy e s
years y e sy e sy e sy e sy e sy e s
regions y e sy e sy e sy e sy e sy e s
R-squared 0.68 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.86
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (p-value) 0.0746 0.0715 0.0007 0.0009 0.0166 0.0054
Notes: 
Absolute t-values between brackets. Estimation method : population-weighted 2SLS.  Instruments used for Vol-2,
Ed-ineq, Credit, Goved are the lagged value (value of previous interval) of each  variable respectively.  
Dependent variable : average educational attainment (years of schooling) measured at t=1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000 (source : Barro and Lee, 2000). 
Explanatory variables: Vol-2: gliding 10 year standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth (source : PWT
Mark.6.1.) averaged over the 5 years before t , Credit : Domestic credit provided by the banking sector, in % of
GDP, averaged over the five years before t (source : World Bank, 2003), Edineq : educational inequality in the
period of 5 years before t (Gini, source : Castelló and Doménech, 2001),  Goved : log of real per capita
government spending on education in the period of 5 years before t (source: Heylen et al., 2004). For the
specification of three dummies (rich, midd, poor) see main text.
114. Theoretical extension
In this section we show that a simple extension of the model presented by Checchi and
García-Peñalosa (2004) can explain our empirical findings. Like these authors we assume an
open economy with perfect physical capital mobility and immobile labour. The world interest
rate is constant. However, instead of assuming two types of labour (skilled and unskilled) who
work with the same technology, we allow for differences in technology. These differences
imply a different level and a different volatility of labour effectiveness for each type.
4.1. Firms
Firms have the following production function: 
Y t=K
[At LA,thB t LB,t]
1−, 01 2
Aggregate output is produced by physical capital K and two types of labour according to a
constant returns to scale production technology.  LA workers are unskilled, LB are skilled.
Both types are perfect substitutes in production. Population is normalized to one, implying
that LALB=1.  A key element in the production function is that workers with different
skills work with different kinds of technology. Unskilled workers employ basic technologies.
Each worker provides A units of effective labour. Skilled workers have not only acquired
more human capital (h), they can also handle more advanced technologies. Each skilled
worker provides Bh units of effective labour. The focus of our paper being on macroeconomic
volatility, we take h to be non-stochastic. A and B however are vulnerable to productivity
shocks. More precisely, they can take values A,A and B,B respectively, both with
probability  one  half,  where AAand BB .   T h e y  h a v e  m e a n




2−B B . O u r
expectation is that since educated workers are able to handle more advanced technologies,
which often allow people to better face shocks, their labour effectiveness will be less volatile
B≤ A .
Clearly we could put more structure in the above specification. An obvious case would be that
B=A , which would imply that shocks to both productivity levels are related. In our
analysis below we develop the more general case. The restriction B=A can however
easily be imposed. 
We assume that firms decide on their stock of capital after the productivity shocks are is
realised and pay wages after production.  They equate the (given) world interest rate r to the
marginal product of capital
7.  This implies a constant capital labour ratio, and wages in period
t of   A,t=Atw, B,t=Bthw , where w is the constant wage per unit of effective
labour
8.
















Each worker lives for two periods. In the first period he decides whether or not to study. In the
second period, he works either as an educated worker or as an unskilled worker. Entire
consumption c takes place in the second period. In the second period workers also leave a
bequest b to their children. Lifetime utility of agent i is U it=1−lncitlnbit .
Note that utility is realised during the second period. Income from work during that period
depends on the level of human capital of the worker and on the (good or bad) state of the
economy. 








subject to Y it=citbit ,Y it=citbit , where a bar above (below) a variable indicates its value
in the good (bad) state of the world. 
The solution to this problem implies that, at any time, a fraction of income α is bequeathed
and a fraction (1-α) is consumed, which leads to the following equation for expected utility in






[lnY itlnY it] 5
4.3. Education
An agent who decides to study in the first period of his life pays a fixed education cost f. He
can  pay for  this  cost  either  by  using  the  inheritance xit received  from  his  parent
xit=bit−1 or by borrowing on the capital market at interest rate r. Paying this cost the
agent acquires education which allows him to work as a skilled worker in the second period.
Alternatively, he can choose not to pay the education cost, but to invest the received
inheritance. He will then work as an unskilled worker. The expected utilities of being




















ln[BhwRxit− f ] 7
where R=1+r.  An agent chooses to study if the expected utility of doing so exceeds that of






































Under  the  assumption  that  the  expected  gain  from  studying  is  positive,  i.e.
whB−A−Rf 0 , these partial derivatives imply that
– if the labour effectiveness and the wage of the unskilled become more volatile, the
threshold value of inheritance needed to study x* decreases.  Given the initial distribution
of wealth, the long-run number of educated workers will rise.
– If the labour effectiveness and the wage of the skilled become more volatile, the threshold
value of inheritance needed to study x* increases.  Given the initial distribution of wealth,
the long-run number of educated workers decreases. 
Furthermore, it can easily be observed that ∂x*/∂ f 0
9 .  An increase in the cost of
schooling raises the threshold value of inheritance. Given the initial distribution of wealth, the
fraction of educated workers will then fall. The effects of changes in the other determinants of
x* cannot be determined analytically in general.  We have therefore simulated the model.
Table 6 presents starting values for the parameters. These starting values have been chosen
under the restriction of obtaining realistic relative wages of skilled versus unskilled workers, a
positive expected gain from studying and non-negative values for x*.   We present two sets of
starting values (S1 and S2), the first of which imposes  AB , the second one where
 A=B .
  Table 6. Simulation: starting values
Basic parameters S1 S2 Implied values I1 I2
   0.34 0.34 A 0.875 0.875
   R   2.09 2.09  A 0.275 0.275
   h  2 2   Expected wage unskilled   Aw 0.317 0.317
A   0.60 0.60
A   1.15 1.15 B 1.445 1.445
B   1.25 1.17 B 0.195 0.275
B   1.64 1.72   Expected wage skilled  Bwh 1.047 1.047
    f   0.345 0.345   Expected relative wage  A/Bh 0.303 0.303
Note : The value for R follows from assuming an annual real rate of interest of 3% and periods of 25 years.
9An increase in f reduces the denominator in (8) , while the effect on the numerator  is 2RwhB−Rf ,
which is > 0 under our assumption that  whB−A−Rf 0 .
14In addition to the above mentioned results for the effects of changes in  A,B  and f,  the
simulations reveal that a rise in h lower the threshold value of inheritance x*.
4.4.Interpretation
The data and our empirical analysis in the previous sections reveal several interesting facts.
First, we have found that rising macroeconomic volatility, higher government expenditures on
education and lower inequality may stimulate human capital (see Tables 3 and 4). Second, as
is clear from Figure 1, more volatile economies tend to have lower human capital, and vice
versa. In this section we show that our model can rationalize these facts.
The positive causal effect of macroeconomic volatility on human capital formation is not a
straightforward result from our model.  As the partial derivatives in (9) and (10) and
additional simulations show, this positive causal effect requires macroeconomic volatility to
be driven by volatility in the labour effectiveness of the unskilled.     To explain the
significantly positive empirical effects of government expenditures on human capital, our
model can provide only indirect justification. Government behaviour has not been modelled
explicitly, but one can obviously think of higher government education spending reducing the
cost of schooling f or increasing the productivity of schooling h. Both effects bring down x*
and reduce the threshold level of inheritance needed for agents to decide to invest in an
education.  
Finally, although our model can explain a positive causal effect of macroeconomic volatility
(if it is driven by volatility in the labour effectiveness of the unskilled) on human capital , it
can also rationalize the simple negative correlation in Figure 1.  For illustrative purposes,
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the standard deviation of the growth rate of
macroeconomic output Y and the fraction of skilled workers, LB , building on the parameter
values in Table 6. The underlying growth rates have been calculated as follows.   Since both A
and  B can be low or high, we can distinguish 4 different macroeconomic output levels for a
given set of parameter values and given LA and LB.  In two consecutive periods output can
either stay at the same level, or switch to another  one ( because of shocks in the labour
effectiveness of the skilled/unskilled).  This means that for given parameter values there are
16 possible new 'states' for the economy, each implying a possible growth rate.  Calculating
the standard deviation over these 16 possible growth rates, we obtain a measure of the
(possible) macroeconomic volatility for a given set of parameter values.  By recalculating this
measure for different values of  LB (and LA) Figure 4 is obtained.  As can be seen, in Figure 4
higher levels of macroeconomic volatility are associated with lower fractions of skilled
workers.
15Figure 4.  Volatility and the fraction of skilled workers
Underlying parameter values are reported in Table 6. 
5. Conclusions
Our findings in this paper can be summarized as follows. 
1. Existing empirical results that macroeconomic volatility undermines human capital are not
robust. Even updating to the Penn World Tables Mark 6.1. database seems to make an
important difference for the results.
2. An important channel along which volatility affects human capital is its (negative) relation
to government education spending. Controlling for education spending in our regressions
(using a time-invariant volatility measure) turns the volatility effect  from negative into
non-negative.
3. We confirm standard results from the literature that government spending on education
stimulates human capital (Flug et al., 1998;  Christou, 2001; Checchi and García-Peñalosa,
2004). Our results for the influence of financial depth are less robust.
4. Using a time-varying measure of macroeconomic volatility we find a positive effect of
volatility on human capital. The effects of macroeconomic volatility on human capital
depend on countries’ structural characteristics. We find that this positive effect is stronger
(and significant) in rich countries, with income levels being measured in 1960. These
results provide one way to explain the findings by Fatás (2002) and Hnatkovska and
Loayza (2003) with respect to the effects of volatility on growth.  The volatility effect
remains positive when we control for possible endogeneities using 2SLS.
5. An extension of the theoretical model developed by Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2004)
rationalizes our findings that the effect of macroeconomic volatility on human capital
formation is not as robustly negative as stated in existing literature.  
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that volatility may make people want to study
more for reasons of insurance. (Educated people may face less risk and uncertainty).
Government education expenditures reducing the cost of studying may be crucial to realise
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